Philosophical presentism
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Philosophical presentism is the opinion that there are only current entities (or, equivalent, that everything is present). According to presentism, then, there are no completely passed or simply future entities. In a sense, the past and the future do not exist for the presentists: events have happened (they have existed) and the future events will occur (they will exist), but neither exists at all since they do not exist now.
Presentism is a vision of temporary ontology that contrasts with eternalism, the opinion that there are past, present and future entities (that is, the ontological thesis of the theory of the universe of the block), and with non -futurism, the vision, the vision that only passed and present there are entities (that is, the ontological thesis of the theory of the growing block).
A main objection to presentism comes from the idea that what is true depends substantially on what exists (or that the truth depends or 'supervene' on being). In particular, it is said that presentism is in conflict with the theory of the creator of truth, a theory that seeks to capture the dependence of truth by being with the idea that truths (for example, true propositions) are true in the virtue of the existence of an entity or entities ('real creators').
The conflict arises because most presenters accept that there are transcendent and objective truths that transcend evidence about the past (and some accept that there are truths about the future, the rhythm of concerns about fatalism), but presenters deny the existence of the existence of The obvious manufacturers of truth for such such truths. For example, most presenters accept that it is true that Marie Curie discovered Polonio, but deny that her discovery event exists (because it is a totally past event).
The presentists have been accused of violating the plausible principle of truth (which the truths require real creators) and ontologically 'trap'. Presentists can respond to this objection or denying that the truths about the past require real creators (that is, they can accept the principle of real creator for some truths, but denies that it is applied in general, or reject the manufacturer of the manufacturer of the Truth wholesale principle), or placing existing entities to play the role of real creators for the truths about the past.